In a published opinion filed February 13, 2019, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Division 3) reaffirmed the need for a CEQA litigant challenging a coastal development permit to appeal to the Coastal Commission before suing. Fudge v. City of Laguna Beach (Hany Dimitry; Real Party in Interest) (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 193. The Court refused plaintiff’s invitation to make the simple complex, and followed published precedents requiring a plaintiff to exhaust the statutory administrative remedy of an appeal to the Commission to ripen a litigation challenge.
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Litigation
First District Upholds CEQA Class 3 Categorical Exemption For Single Family Residence Projects In Berkeley Hills, Rejects Claim That “Location” Exception Applies Based On Site’s Location Within Mapped Earthquake Fault And Landslide Areas
By Arthur F. Coon on
Posted in CEQA Guidelines, CEQA-in-reverse, Exemptions, Land Use, Litigation, Mitigation, Resources, Standard of Review
In a partially published opinion filed January 30, 2019, the First District Court of Appeal (Div. 1) affirmed a judgment denying a writ petition challenging the City of Berkeley’s approval of use permits for three single-family homes on three contiguous hillside parcels. The Court upheld the City’s use of the CEQA Guidelines § 15303(a) (Class 3) categorical exemption for new construction of small structures, including “up to three single-family residences” in “urbanized areas.” Berkeley Hills Watershed Coalition v. City of Berkeley (Matthew Wadlund, et al., Real Parties in Interest) (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 880.
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California Supreme Court Grants Review Of Regulatory Taking Issues In San Diego Single Family Residence CEQA Case; Merits Briefs To Be Filed Soon
Most real estate developers would likely agree that, even when correctly applied and complied with, CEQA can be an onerous law which can significantly complicate, delay, increase the cost of, and in some cases (particularly where CEQA litigation is involved) even preclude projects. But what recourse does a project applicant have under the law when CEQA is misapplied – and blatantly so – by a local agency which denies approval of a project that is clearly exempt from CEQA on the meritless basis that extensive (and expensive) CEQA review is required? When the developer’s only recourse is time-consuming and expensive litigation to obtain a writ of mandate setting aside the agency’s illegal action subjecting the project to CEQA, can the developer who succeeds in obtaining the writ recover from the public agency compensation and damages resulting from the temporary “taking” of all reasonable economic use of its property?
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Fourth District Rejects CEQA Challenge To San Diego’s Use of Existing Facilities Categorical Exemption For Mission Beach Amusement Park Lease Amendment and Extension
By Arthur F. Coon on
In an opinion filed December 27, 2018, and later ordered published on January 15, 2019, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 1) affirmed the trial court’s judgment rejecting CEQA and other challenges to the City of San Diego’s (City) approval of an amended and restated lease of City-owned land containing an oceanfront amusement park in its Mission Beach neighborhood (Belmont Park), which restated lease potentially extends the prior lease term for a significant period. San Diegans For Open Government v. City of San Diego (Symphony Asset Pool XVI, LLC, Real Party in Interest) (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 349.
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Delineating CEQA’s Scope: First District Holds CEQA Does Not Apply To Ministerial Approval Of Multifamily Housing Project Allowed By Right Under Zoning Where City’s Discretion Was Limited To Design Review
In an opinion filed December 18, 2018, and later ordered published on January 10, 2019, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment denying appellant citizen groups’ writ petition challenging the City of St. Helena’s approval of an 8-unit, multifamily housing project and related demolition and design review. McCorkle Eastside Neighborhood Group, et al. v. City of St. Helena, et al. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 80. The decision applied the basic principle that CEQA does not apply to ministerial project approvals, and further clarified that CEQA does not apply to “mixed” discretionary/ministerial approvals where the “discretionary component” does not give the agency the authority to mitigate environmental impacts. It held that because the City’s discretion under its local design review ordinance does not extend to addressing environmental effects it does not implicate CEQA, and therefore the City’s reliance on the CEQA Guidelines’ Class 32 exemption was unnecessary.
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Connecting The CEQA Dots? Supreme Court Holds Friant Ranch Project EIR’s Air Quality Impacts Discussion Insufficiently Relates Pollutant Data To Specific Adverse Human Health Effects
By Arthur F. Coon on
In a unanimous 33-page opinion authored by Justice Ming Chin and issued on December 24, 2018, the California Supreme Court addressed the standard of review for claims challenging the legal sufficiency of an EIR’s discussion of environmental impacts, and also CEQA’s rules regarding deferral and adequacy of mitigation measures. Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (Friant Ranch, L.P.) (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, Case No. S219783. In affirming in part and reversing in part the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the Supreme Court held that the EIR for the Friant Ranch Project – a 942-acre master-planned, mixed-use development with over 2,500 senior residential units, 250,000 square feet of commercial space, and extensive open space/ recreational amenities on former agricultural land in north central Fresno County – was deficient in its informational discussion of air quality impacts as they connect to adverse human health effects. In doing so, the decision provides guidance in an area – the legal adequacy of an EIR’s discussion on a topic required by CEQA – that it held does not fit neatly within CEQA’s usual standard of review dichotomy, which provides for de novo review and exacting judicial scrutiny of alleged procedural errors (e.g., an EIR’s complete omission of a required topic area) and deferential substantial evidence review of an EIR’s or agency’s factual determinations and conclusions.
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State Courts Lack Jurisdiction Over CEQA Challenge To Matters Within FERC’s Jurisdiction In Hydroelectric Dam Relicensure Process For Oroville Dam Facilities
By Arthur F. Coon on
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) issues licenses needed to construct and operate hydroelectric dams pursuant to the Federal Power Act (“FPA”; 16 U.S.C. § 791a, et seq). Under long-standing law, and with the limited exception of state-issued water quality certifications, the FPA “occupies the field” of licensing a hydroelectric dam, and bars environmental review of the federal licensing procedure in state courts; this preemption is necessary because recognizing a “dual final authority” for such projects would be “unworkable.” (First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Com. (1946) 328 U.S. 152.) States have limited authority under the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1341) to impose stricter water quality conditions than are federally required on a FERC license, through the section 401 water quality certification process, but must act on a project applicant’s certification request within one year or certification is deemed waived. (33 U.S.C. § 401(a)(1); Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC (D.C. Cir. 2011) 643 F.3d 963, 972.) Further, any disputes concerning the Federal licensing process or the adequacy of “required studies” for that process (including “environmental studies” serving as the predicate for the state’s water quality certification conditions) are subject to FERC’s review. (18 C.F.R. part 4, 34(i)(b)(vii) (2003).)
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When CEQA Gets Ugly: Third District Holds Lay Public Opinion Supports Fair Argument That Project May Have Significant Aesthetic Effect Requiring EIR
By Arthur F. Coon on
In a published opinion filed December 17, 2018, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment granting a writ setting aside El Dorado County’s approval of, and related Mitigated Negative Declaration (MND) for, construction of a Dollar General Store in the “quaint” downtown area of unincorporated Georgetown, a Gold Rush-era “hamlet” designated as a State Historical Landmark. Georgetown Preservation Society v. County of El Dorado (Simoncre Abbie, LLC, Real Party in Interest) (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 358. The Court held lay public commentary on nontechnical issues concerning the project’s size and general appearance constituted substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project may have significant aesthetic impacts, and thus required an EIR, notwithstanding County’s findings that the project complied with its Historic Design Guide. The Court also held County’s failure to make explicit findings in the record on alleged credibility and foundation issues precluded its “manufacturing after-the-fact findings” to justify its dismissal of the public comments on the ground that they did not constitute “substantial evidence.”
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2018 Year-End CEQA Round-Up
By Matthew C. Henderson & Arthur F. Coon on
Posted in Affordable Housing, CEQA Guidelines, Exemptions, Land Use, Legislation, Litigation, Reform, Water Supply
As we draw near the close of another year, a number of recent CEQA developments bear noting.
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CEQA Plaintiff’s Failure To Appeal Incorrectly Labeled “Interlocutory” Decision Granting Peremptory Writ Barred Appellate Review Of Decision On Later Appeal From Post-Judgment Order Erroneously Labeled “Final Judgment”
By Arthur F. Coon on
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet;” – William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II, ll. 47-48.
In a partially published 40-page opinion filed on November 26, 2018, the Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s post-judgment order determining that respondents’ (City of San Juan Bautista and its city council) supplemental return complied with a previously issued peremptory writ and CEQA as directed. But the opinion’s most valuable message to those toiling in the garden of the law – a profession where using the correct words is of paramount importance – is a simple Shakespearean one, to wit: a final judgment by any other name is still a final judgment. Alliance of Concerned Citizens Organized For Responsible Development v. City of San Juan Bautista (Harbhajan Dadwal, Real Party in Interest) (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 424.