In an important published opinion filed March 26, 2026, the First District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) affirmed a trial court’s judgment denying the third CEQA writ petition filed over the last fifteen years challenging Caltrans’ EIR for a project to improve a one-mile stretch of U.S. Highway 101 running through Richardson Grove State Park in Humboldt County. At issue in each action filed in the serial CEQA litigations – which the Court described as a “labyrinthine” “15-year litigation odyssey” – was the legal adequacy of the EIR’s analysis of the project’s impacts on adjacent old-growth redwood trees and their root systems. Bess Bair et al. v. California Department of Transportation et al. (2026) ___ Cal.App.5th ___. After an extensive procedural and legal analysis, the Court held the last petition was properly denied on res judicata grounds following the trial court’s discharge of peremptory writs in the two earlier actions by final orders that were never appealed.
Brief Summary of Case’s Procedural Background and Holding
In 2014, the Court of Appeal in a published opinion invalidated Caltrans’ EIR for failure to properly evaluate the project’s impacts on the redwood trees. (Lotus v. Department of Transportation (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 645, my 2/14/14 post on which can be found here.) A second writ petition following that round of litigation invalidated the EIR Addendum Caltrans prepared to comply with the first writ due to Caltrans’ failure to circulate it for public review and comment. After Caltrans circulated the Addendum and recertified the EIR and Addendum, both writs were discharged over Petitioners’ objections; Petitioners chose not to appeal those discharge orders. However, Petitioners filed and pursued a new action – the third writ petition in the serial CEQA litigation – challenging the adequacy of the Addendum under CEQA. The trial court ultimately ruled that the third petition was barred by the prior final discharge orders, and that it lacked merit in any event. On petitioners’ appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that judgment based on res judicata due to the final discharge of the Lotus writ (the writ issued in the initially filed CEQA action).
The gist of the Court’s holding is pithily summarized in its opinion’s introductory section as follows:
In discharging the writ that issued in the first proceeding (the Lotus writ), the superior court necessarily determined that the revised environmental analysis in the Addendum complies with CEQA, and its decision became final without an appeal. Res judicata bars petitioners from relitigating that question anew in this case.”
The Opinion’s Detailed Discussion of the History
of the Serial CEQA Litigations
For those wishing to dig deeper, the Court’s 32-page slip opinion discussed the factual and procedural history of the “15-year litigation odyssey” leading to its holding in much greater detail than the above summary. Of foundational relevance was the writ of mandate originally issued in 2014 after the first appellate opinion (the “Lotus writ”). That CEQA writ contained several remedial mandates: (1) it ordered Caltrans to set aside the project approvals and EIR certification; (2) it enjoined Caltrans from taking any project-related actions that could alter the environment until it had “taken any and all actions necessary to comply with CEQA in accordance with the Opinion of the Court of Appeal issued on January 30, 2014” (emph. added); and (3) it retained jurisdiction in the trial court until it determined Caltrans had complied with the writ. The Court of Appeal’s opinion, distilled to its essentials, required Caltrans to “modif[y] … those portions of the EIR discussing impacts on old growth redwood trees and proposed mitigation measures in compliance with CEQA.”
As directed by the Lotus writ, Caltrans rescinded the project approvals and decertified the EIR, and then “prepared an Addendum [to the EIR] addressing anew the project’s impacts on old growth redwood trees.” After Caltrans recertified the EIR with the Addendum, and reapproved the project in 2017, many of the original Lotus petitioners, joined by two new petitioners including Bair, filed a second CEQA writ petition challenging the recertified EIR on both substantive (i.e., alleged inadequate impact disclosure, analysis and mitigation) and procedural (i.e., failure to circulate) grounds (“Bair I”).
Shortly after the second (Bair I) petition was filed, Caltrans filed a return to the Lotus writ, asserting it had complied with the writ through preparation of the Addendum, and asking the Court to discharge it. The Lotus petitioners opposed the discharge and asked that the Lotus and Bair I actions be consolidated due to the overlapping issues of the Addendum’s adequacy under CEQA. In mid-2018, the trial court denied discharge without prejudice pending resolution of Bair I.
In 2019, the trial court, after considering all parties’ arguments as to the Addendum’s adequacy under CEQA, issued a judgment and writ ordering the project approvals to be set aside, enjoining Caltrans from altering the physical environment pending compliance, and ordering that the Addendum and a related Tree Report be circulated for public review and comment, while reserving jurisdiction to determine compliance with the new Bair I judgment and writ. Significantly, despite the overlapping issues and arguments raised the parties, the Bair I judgment and writ did not directly address whether the Addendum complied with the substantive mandates of the Lotus writ, and did not direct Caltrans to revise any of the substance of the Addendum or Tree Report – ambiguities that would give rise to later disagreements over the preclusive effect of the Bair I judgment and writ (an issue the Court of Appeal ultimately did not need to address).
In 2023, after Caltrans again set aside the project approvals and decertified the EIR in response to the Bair I writ, it circulated the EIR and Addendum for public comment, responding to public comments in the Addendum, consulted with the Parks Department (which had no comments and positively endorsed Caltrans’ planning efforts), and thereafter recertified the EIR and Addendum and reapproved the project, again concluding it would have no significant effect on the environment. Caltrans then filed a single return to both the Lotus and Bair I writs explaining in detail how it had complied with each and requesting that they both be discharged.
The Bair petitioners response was like a double-barreled litigation shotgun: they filed consolidated objections to the joint return and request for discharge, and concurrently filed a new action, the third petition for writ of mandate and injunctive relief (“Bair II”), challenging the project reapproval. The objections to discharge incorporated the Bair II writ petition and overlapped in substance. The objections claimed the Addendum’s analysis of the project’s impacts to redwoods was still flawed and that the EIR violated CEQA; the Bair II petition made the same claims, and also asserted that no court had yet ruled on the substantive adequacy of the 2017 Addendum.
Petitioners also complained that Caltrans’ return and discharge request failed to include the Addendum, Tree Report, and public comments, and thus failed to provide an adequate administrative record for the Court to adjudicate Caltrans’ compliance with the writ.
In short summary, Bair II alleged the same substantive CEQA challenges as Lotus and Bair I, and petitioners simultaneously objected to discharge of the Lotus and Bair I writs on all the same grounds, i.e., the legal inadequacy of the 2017 Addendum as an informational and analytical document under CEQA. When Petitioners moved to consolidate all three cases, they repeatedly stressed in their motion papers that all three hinged on that single issue, the only difference being the state of their records. (That consolidation motion was later denied by a different judge for reasons not appearing on the record, and petitioners did not seek review of that ruling.)
Meanwhile, Caltrans filed its own motion to discharge both writs and petitioners opposed it; finding some common ground, all parties agreed the Lotus writ should be discharged if the 2017 Addendum cured the defects identified by the appellate court. Caltrans argued that Bair I implicitly adjudicated that issue in its favor when it ruled on Petitioners’ comprehensive CEQA challenge to the Addendum and granted only the limited procedural writ remedy requiring circulation. Petitioners argued the Lotus writ had not been complied with and should not be discharged, that Bair I decided only the procedural issue expressly addressed, and not the Addendum’s substantive sufficiency, and that Caltrans failed to demonstrate CEQA compliance because it had not provided a complete administrative record in its return or motion papers. The Court observed that Petitioners unequivocally asserted that discharge of the writs required Caltrans to demonstrate it had fully complied with CEQA.
While the motion to discharge was pending, Caltrans demurred to the Bair II petition on the merits and based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. That demurrer was overruled and the case proceeded to a briefing and hearing on the merits.
Meanwhile, the trial court granted Caltrans’ motion to discharge the Lotus and Bair I writs in a one-page ruling stating no grounds. Petitioners did not appeal that discharge order and it became final.
Thereafter, Caltrans contended in its Bair II merits briefing that the preclusive effects of the prior judgments and the discharge of the writs in Lotus and Bair I barred Petitioners’ CEQA challenges to the Addendum (with the exception of two issues – adequacy of responses to comments and procedural manner of reapproval – which petitioners did not raise on appeal). The trial court agreed; it denied the Bair II writ petition in a 5-page ruling, finding that all petitioners’ challenges (except for the two matters mentioned above, as to which it found Caltrans complied with CEQA) were barred by the discharge of the two writs.
Petitioners appealed the ensuing judgment denying their Bair II petition. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
The Court of Appeal’s Analysis and Key Takeaways
Key points of the Court of Appeal’s opinion include:
- The application of res judicata presents a question of law subject to de novo review. (Citing Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 519, 544.)
- Res judicata (a/k/a “claim preclusion”) prevents relitigation of the “same cause of action” in a subsequent lawsuit between the same parties (or their privies) after there has been a final judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit.
- Res judicata bars litigation not only of issues actually raised in the prior case, but of issues that could have been, but were not raised. (Citing Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202.) The doctrine aims to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and prevent inconsistent decisions and repetitive litigation, i.e., to promote finality. (Citing Guerrero v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1099.)
- Preliminarily, the Court found it need not resolve the parties’ dispute over whether the Bair I judgment and/or discharge of the Bair I writ resolved the Bair II claims on their merits “because regardless, the discharge of the Lotus writ conclusively established the Addendum’s substantive adequacy and the discharge of that writ was final and therefore bars relitigation of the issues petitioners have raised again in this case [Bair II].”
- The Court found Silverado Modjeska Recreation & Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282 to be closely on point. There, writ petitioners successfully challenged a lead agency’s EIR, obtaining a judgment and writ compelling preparation and circulation of a supplemental EIR analyzing water quality impacts. After preparing and circulating the new analysis, the agency recertified the EIR, which the same petitioners challenged in a second writ petition alleging failure to comply with the earlier writ. The lead agency in the original case moved to discharge the writ; the court granted the extensively briefed motion, ruling unambiguously based on a substantial administrative record submitted by the parties that the agency’s supplemental analysis complied with the writ, and thus with CEQA; and petitioners didn’t appeal the discharge order. Thereafter, the court in the second case ruled petitioners’ challenge to the agency’s writ compliance was barred by res judicata, and the appellate court affirmed that ruling, concluding that the trial court’s discharge order was a full and final adjudication of the agency’s compliance with the writ’s commands which barred the second action.
- As in Silverado, the allegations in the third petition in the Caltrans litigation clearly showed that it was seeking “to compel Caltrans to fix the very same CEQA deficiencies that the [first] Lotus writ compelled it to fix, and thus in substance is challenging Caltrans’ compliance with the Lotus writ.” Indeed, the Bair II petitioners repeatedly stated and confirmed that their petition and objections to writ discharge were based on the same alleged premise, i.e., Caltrans’ 2017 Addendum’s failure to comply with the writ by including a CEQA-compliant analysis of the project’s impacts on old-growth redwood trees. Thus, the discharge of the Lotus writ over petitioners’ objections necessarily decided the merits of the “primary right” petitioners were litigating and it becomes final after petitioners failed to appeal it.
- The Court of Appeal criticized a published decision not cited by the parties, Central Delta Water Agency v. Department of Water Resources (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 170 (our 9/28/21 post on which can be found here), which rejected application of res judicata and held an order discharging a writ that required preparation and certification of a CEQA-compliant EIR did not preclude a second action challenging the revised EIR because the issues could not have been litigated in the original case. The Court found that aspect of Central Delta Water Agency to be “analytically in tension with Silverado” and declined to follow it.
- In explaining its criticism of Central Delta Water Agency’s res judicata analysis, the Court stated in a key passage of its opinion:
Central Delta Water Agency’s analytical flaw is that it asked the wrong question. It focused on whether the revised EIR’s substantive adequacy could have been litigated before entry of judgment in the first mandamus action. Of course it could not have been; just as in Silverado, it didn’t exist at that juncture. As in Silverado, DWR’s sole reason for preparing it was to comply with the writ directing it to fix the deficiencies in the original EIR by preparing a new EIR that complies with CEQA. Central Delta Water Agency did not ask, but should have, whether the revised EIR’s compliance with CEQA could have been litigated in response to DWR’s post judgment requests to discharge the writ. That is the mode of analysis employed in Silverado and we agree with it. [Citation] Central Delta Water Agency’s analysis is thus confusing and unhelpful. It also does not acknowledge or address Silverado’s holding. To the extent they are in conflict, we find Silverado better reasoned and follow it here.” (Emph. Court’s.)
- The Court rejected Petitioners’ attempt to distinguish Silverado on the basis that the full administrative record was before the trial court that discharged the writ there, whereas it was not before the trial court that discharged the Lotus writ. Petitioners cited no authority that the trial court was precluded from discharging the writ in such circumstances nor did they address whose burden it was to provide any supplemental record (if one were required at all). Moreover, Petitioners’ concerns had no bearing on whether discharge of the Lotus writ was on the merits, but in effect were assertions that the trial court erred in discharging the writ. That particular dog didn’t hunt because the post-judgment discharge order was appealable and when Petitioners filed to appeal it, it became final; its preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata, unquestionably, did not depend on whether it was correct.
- Nor, per the Court, did it matter that the trial court did not make express findings on the merits in discharging the writ; petitioners cited no authority that express findings are required to discharge a writ or that the application of res judicata requires an express determination on the merits. If ambiguous, a judgment’s scope, meaning, and effect may be interpreted based on the entire record and the context in which it was entered; here, it was evident from the trial court’s ruling, and the extensive briefing on the discharge issue, that the discharge order adjudicated the merits.
- The Court finally rejected Petitioners’ argument, made under City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 964, that the Lotus writ discharge order was not preclusive because they were allowed by law to challenge writ compliance in a separate proceeding. The Court’s “short answer” was that Silverado directly refuted this assertion on materially the same facts. Its “long answer” was that City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, a non-CEQA case, did not address claim preclusion (nor did its progeny), and merely held a trial court may adjudicate the adequacy of an agency’s return in the original writ action and that a new action need not be initiated to do so. While City of Carmel-by-the-Sea opined in dictum that a new action would be proper, it never said “that both options can be pursued simultaneously much less opine that, if they are, res judicata might not at some point present an obstacle.”
- Similarly, while some of “the CEQA cases that follow in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea’s footsteps” “suggest that filing a new proceeding to challenge a party’s compliance with a [CEQA] writ … is permissible, none address whether doing so will be barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel if both are pursued simultaneously and the writ is discharged on the merits before the new proceeding concludes. [Citations]”
- The Court of Appeal tried to make some sense of the conflicting precedents, and interestingly observed: “Silverado questioned whether a trial court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate compliance with a CEQA writ in a new, independent action but did not reach the question.” The Court of Appeal here also declined to do so, given that no party had raised the issue and it did not need to resolve it, but nonetheless noted (in a footnote) that the issue implicated Public Resources Code § 21168.9, CEQA’s remedies statute, which “raises a significant question as to whether the general principles discussed in [City of Carmel-by-the-Sea] … concerning the procedural vehicles for litigating writ compliance extend to CEQA cases.” In any event, and assuming without deciding that filing a new writ proceeding to challenge compliance with a writ issued in a CEQA case is procedurally and jurisdictionally proper, the Court held that the trial court nonetheless correctly ruled here. Per the Court, petitioners, by litigating writ compliance simultaneously in multiple separate proceedings, created confusion and “set[] up a classic (and self-inflicted) race to judgment” which they lost when they “lost the first of their cases to reach finality[.]”
Conclusion and Implications
The First District’s published opinion is a “must-read” for CEQA and land use litigators. By conducting a deeper analysis into the doctrine, it makes a valuable contribution to the evolving CEQA jurisprudence applying res judicata in the context of enforcing, and adjudicating compliance with, judgments and peremptory writs of mandate. Yet it still only scratches the surface of the complex set of legal rules and principles governing writ interpretation, writ compliance via return and discharge, the extent of a trial court’s continuing writ enforcement jurisdiction, and whether parties can or must challenge writ compliance (or raise new claims) by objections or separate action.
The opinion highlights an analytical split in authorities on the issue whether, for purposes of res judicata, the legal adequacy of a CEQA writ compliance effort resulting in a revised EIR can be litigated by writ return and objections in the original action (holding under the better-reasoned authority of Silverado that it can), but goes further by seriously questioning whether it must, i.e., asking if it is even procedurally or jurisdictionally proper to litigate such attempted compliance writ in a new, independent action (strongly suggesting it may not be). I agree with the First District’s Opinion that Silverado’s mode of res judicata analysis is correct, at least in the writ compliance context presented here, because employing Central Delta Water Agency’s analysis would render res judicata completely impotent to achieve its goal of finality in CEQA cases where the only remaining issue is compliance with the terms of a peremptory writ; in that context, it seems that bona fide disputes regarding whether the existing writ has been complied with should always be litigated by way of objections to the return in the existing action, not in a new action.
That said, a separate action may be necessary where new issues are raised that could not be litigated by way of objections to a return, e.g., where the writ contained only a set-aside remedy and the trial court lost continuing enforcement jurisdiction after the approvals were duly rescinded. (See, e.g., McCann v. City of San Diego (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 284, my 8/14/23 post on which can be found here.) In such cases, the only possible way to litigate whether a later-certified revised EIR complies with CEQA would appear to be a new action, but res judicata could apply to such a new action to the extent it alleged any claims that had already been adjudicated on their merits adversely to the plaintiff.
Ultimately, this area of the law is complex, and admits of no “one-size-fits-all” rule as to whether CEQA compliance (which often, but not always, is the same as writ compliance) can or must be litigated in a separate action; much depends on the specific remedial mandates and language of the writ at issue, the showing made in the agency’s return, and the nature of the changes (if any) to the project analyzed in the revised EIR. CEQA and land use writ litigators should thus “stay tuned” for what will surely be further litigation developments in this interesting, complex and important area of the law.
Zooming out from the arcane intricacies of writ practice, especially in the CEQA context, I would be remiss to end this post without pointing out the appellate opinion’s closing “big picture” comments on the obstructive delays that are caused by abusive, serial CEQA litigation – problems that the proper application of res judicata can help address. Indeed, reform addressing CEQA litigation abuse has been a favorite topic of mine during the nearly 15 years I’ve been authoring this blog. Since I can’t improve on the Court’s observations, I’ll close by quoting them (with minimal edits) verbatim:
As we recently had occasion to lament, CEQA litigation sometimes threatens to become a never-ending battle over certification of an environmental impact report that can drag on for years, even decades. [Citation] What we said [in Tiburon Open Space Committee v. County of Marin (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 700, 782] . . . is worth repeating: “CEQA was meant to serve noble purposes, but it can be manipulated to be a formidable tool of obstruction . . . .” [Citation] Caltrans’ work on the current environmental analysis that is embodied in the Addendum alone began in 2015, and in the 10-plus years since, not a single trial court judge has concluded the Addendum’s analysis is flawed. Plaintiffs could have appealed the trial court’s order discharging the Lotus writ but chose not to do so. The Addendum’s sufficiency as a CEQA-compliant analysis of the park’s old-growth redwood trees has been conclusively adjudicated and may not be relitigated. This CEQA battle has come to its end.”
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