Lawyers, like all humans, experience the full gamut of life’s difficulties.  Sometimes those intrude into the practice of law itself, up to and including CEQA litigation.  On September 26, 2024, the First District Court of Appeal filed its published its opinion in Friends of the South Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 517, a case dealing with such an unfortunate circumstance, in which the Court had to address the conflicting needs of a lawyer confronting a serious mental illness, the needs of the litigants, and the needs of the functioning of the trial court.  Despite its tangential relationship to the substantive or procedural provisions of CEQA, the case is worth reviewing for the guidance it provides practitioners and litigants dealing with such a scenario in the context of a writ proceeding entitled to calendar preference under CEQA. 

Factual and Procedural Background

The case has its origins in disputes over a timber harvest plan (THP) submitted by the real party in interest to CalFIRE for the logging of 267 acres of redwoods in the Gualala River Watershed. Pursuant to the Forest Practice Act, CalFIRE approved the plan and published its “official response” to the THP.  However, CalFIRE published an incomplete draft of the official response, necessitating a corrected official response filed more than a month later.  During that period, the petitioner Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed suit against CalFIRE’s approval, alleging it violated CEQA and that its official response was deficient. 

As part of that litigation, FSFG alleged that CalFIRE had engaged in misconduct by deliberately publishing an incomplete official response, which it construed as both misleading and spoliation of evidence.  FSFG thus sought both evidentiary and issue sanctions against CalFIRE.  Those sanctions were partially litigated over the better part of a year from August 2022 to June 2023.  However, a primary issue in that litigation became the disability of FSFG’s attorney, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, due to his bipolar disorder, and FSFG’s repeated requests for the continuation of hearings and extensions of time for briefing deadlines under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court (CRC). 

All told, FSFG made seven accommodation requests to the trial court.  The trial court granted the first six, including permission to file a motion reopening discovery, the order granting that motion, and four scheduling adjustments for both the briefing and hearing on the merits as well as for FSFG’s sanctions requests.  While the trial court expressed concern and reluctance with respect to the sixth request in April 2023, it effectively granted it by continuing the merits hearing to June 9, 2023, with a concomitant adjustment to the briefing schedule. 

The next month FSFG sought a seventh accommodation for Mr. Garrett-Steinman’s disability, asking for another modified briefing schedule for the merits and sanctions motion, a briefing extension, and relief from any obligation to meet and confer.  CalFIRE objected to the request, and Mr. Garrett-Steinman provided a lengthy declaration setting forth the tribulations his mental illness had caused him.  Nevertheless, the trial court denied this request, stating that it would create undue financial or administrative burdens for the court and would change “the basic nature of the court’s service, program, or activity” per rule 1.100(f), which governs the denial of accommodation requests.  FSFG sought writ review of that denial, which the Court of Appeal summarily denied.

With respect to the actual substance of FSFG’s claims, the trial court rejected its assertion that CalFIRE had spoliated evidence, but granted its petition on the merits as to the CEQA analysis of impacts related to sedimentation, biological resources, cultural resources, cumulative impacts, and alternatives.  It rejected FSFG’s claim that the tardy publication of the full official response was improper or violated CEQA. 

CalFIRE adhered to the writ, setting aside the approval of the THP.  The trial court then discharged the writ, and the parties stipulated that the trial court could still determine any motion for fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.  FSFG then filed its appeal, premised on the trial court’s denial of its last accommodation request under rule 1.100.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The initial issue confronting the Court of Appeal was whether the appeal was moot given CalFIRE’s withdrawal of its THP approval.  Because the merits of the case affected FSFG’s entitlement to fees under section 1021.5, the Court concluded the case was not moot. 

From there, the Court turned to the merits of the appeal, to wit, whether the trial court was justified in denying FSFG’s seventh accommodation request under rule 1.100.  The underlying policy behind the rule is stated as follows: “It is the policy of the courts of this state to ensure that persons with disabilities have equal and full access to the judicial system. To ensure access to the courts for persons with disabilities, each superior and appellate court must delegate at least one person to be the ADA coordinator, also known as the access coordinator, or designee to address requests for accommodations. This rule is not intended to impose limitations or to invalidate the remedies, rights, and procedures accorded to persons with disabilities under state or federal law.”  (CRC, rule 1.100(b).)  The rule then sets forth the procedure for requesting a disability accommodation.  (CRC, rule 1.100(c).)  A trial court is only allowed to deny a request if it determines that “[t]he applicant has failed to satisfy the requirements of this rule,” “[t]he requested accommodation would create an undue financial or administrative burden on the court,” or “[t]he requested accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”  (CRC, rule 1.100(f).)  The court’s ruling on the request must set forth the nature of the relief accorded or, if denied, the basis of the denial.  (CRC, rule 1.100(e).) 

While rule 1.100 imposes procedural requirements, the actual substance of a trial court’s decision with respect to an application is left to the court’s discretion.  The Court of Appeal noted that review of an order under rule 1.100 is conducted under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, with the underlying factual determinations reviewed for substantial evidence.  Based on these very deferential standards, the Court had little trouble affirming the judgment.  “Here, the court displayed considerable patience with a lawyer who was clearly capable of handling the complexities of a CEQA case—as evidenced by the overall result on the merits—but whose medical condition apparently prevented him from working at the pace the court was entitled to expect in a proceeding subject to statutory calendaring priority.  What eventually happened, as we read the record, is that the court’s patience ran out. After multiple requests for scheduling postponements, and after FSFG’s failure to retain additional counsel, the trial court appears to have concluded FSFG was attempting to use Garrett-Steinman’s medical condition as an excuse for scheduling postponements of indefinite duration.”  (Slip. Opn., pp. 18-19, footnote omitted.)  Because Mr. Garrett-Steinman had not associated in counsel, despite his representation that he would do so, and because FSFG’s repeated requests were, in effect, delaying the merits hearing indefinitely, and interfering in the trial court’s docket and operation in doing so, it was reasonable for the court to deny the seventh accommodation request. 

The Court reviewed at length and distinguished In re Marriage of James &  Christine C. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1261, a case heavily relied on by FSFG to support its argument that the trial court lacked discretion to deny its final request for accommodation under rule 1.100.  In that case a divorcing spouse pro per litigant with bipolar disorder and breast cancer was denied her third continuance request based on  her medical condition despite a doctor’s opinion that she should be hospitalized for case-related stress and the fact that she checked herself into a hospital the day before trial was to resume; trial was completed in her absence and the trial court ruled on division of assets, spousal support, and attorney fees, stating the delay in the proceedings was “absurd” and calling the wife’s “tactics… manipulations to obtain continuances.”  The Christine C. court of appeal reversed, finding the refusal violated rule 1.100 and left a pro per litigant without trial counsel or the ability to be present at trial, which was obviously prejudicial; accordingly, the pro per litigant should have been granted a continuance as an ADA accommodation. 

In the instant case, the Court found the same “access to justice” concerns were not presented.  Because the rule 1.100 applicant here was a lawyer, not a pro per litigant who could not afford counsel, FSFG was “free to obtain other counsel [and] no credible argument can be made that it was effectively denied access to court services.”  Observing that “FSFG obviously recognized as much,” the Court noted that when it moved – more than 6  months prior to its final continuance – to reopen discovery and extend various deadlines, “FSFG submitted a proposed order inviting the trial court to order Garrett-Steinman to withdraw as counsel.”  The Court of Appeal characterized this as an “extraordinary suggestion” by FSFG to commit error (by kicking its own counsel off the case) that revealed a “fundamental flaw” in its position:  it was not up to the court, but, rather, to FSFG, and to Mr. Garrett-Steinman himself, as an officer of the court, “to assess whether in order to keep the case moving forward, Garrett-Steinman should step aside in favor of some other lawyer.”

Conclusion and Implications

The most direct impact CEQA had on the outcome of this case was its imposition of calendar preference on the litigation, which seems to have factored into the Court’s analysis of the effect of the rule 1.100 accommodation requests on the trial court’s docket and functioning.  In the unfortunate circumstance of a chronic disability, counsel and litigants should be aware of both the application and limits of section 1.100, particularly in the context of writ proceedings that typically are litigated subject to much shorter deadlines and timelines than other civil actions. 



Questions? Please contact Arthur F. Coon of Miller Starr Regalia. Miller Starr Regalia has had a well-established reputation as a leading real estate law firm for more than fifty years. For nearly all that time, the firm also has written Miller & Starr, California Real Estate 4th, a 12-volume treatise on California real estate law. “The Book” is the most widely used and judicially recognized real estate treatise in California and is cited by practicing attorneys and courts throughout the state. The firm has expertise in all real property matters, including full-service litigation and dispute resolution services, transactions, acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, financing, common interest development, construction, management, eminent domain and inverse condemnation, title insurance, environmental law and land use. For more information, visit www.msrlegal.com.