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Potential recovery – or payment – of plaintiffs’ attorneys fees is always a factor to be considered in prosecuting and defending CEQA suits.  The stakes in this calculus just got a little higher with a recent decision making it easier for CEQA plaintiffs to recover fees and expanding the scope of proceedings for which fees can be recovered.  In a pithy opinion (typical of Presiding Justice Gilbert), the Second District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s order partially denying successful CEQA petitioners’ motion for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute.  (Edna Valley Watch v. County of San Luis Obispo (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1312.)  In so doing, it held the trial court erred in finding (1) that fees incurred in administrative proceedings were not recoverable under the statute, and (2) that a nonpecuniary “personal stake” of petitioner in the outcome of the litigation could preclude a fee recovery.

Section 1021.5 provides in part:

Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if:  (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement … are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.
Continue Reading Successful CEQA Petitioners May Recover Attorneys’ Fees For Administrative Proceedings And Are Not Disqualified By Nonpecuniary Stake

Shortly before the close of the last legislative session, I found myself writing a strongly-worded letter (on behalf of myself and interested clients of Miller Starr Regalia) to Governor Brown, the authors of proposed SB 436 (Kehoe) and AB 484 (Alejo) and certain Senate and Assembly Committee Chairs to urge an amendment of – or alternatively a “no” vote on or veto of – those bills.

I specifically requested removal of proposed Government Code § 65968(b), which would have provided:  “A property that has been previously protected for conservation purposes, including the placement of a conservation easement on the property, may not be used for mitigation purposes.”  My letter pointed out that the provision would: (1) constitute an unconstitutional taking of the property rights of farmers and landowners who have granted conservation easements on their properties; (2) violate constitutional prohibitions against contract impairment and public policy favoring freedom of contract; and (3) conflict with the existing statutory law and legislatively-established public policies governing voluntary conservation easements embodied in Civil Code §§ 815, et seq.  In short, it was an illegal “property rights grab.”  And it was buried in an otherwise innocuous bill whose only purpose, as disclosed by every available legislative analysis, was to clarify and expressly authorize a non-controversial existing administrative practice regarding transferring endowment funds from governmental agencies to non-profits that acquire their conservation easements.
Continue Reading CEQA Mitigation On Conservation Easement Lands: How a Plea to Legislators Killed a Threat to Farmers’ Property Rights (For Now)

Everyone seems to talk about abuses of the CEQA process and meaningful CEQA reform, but nothing ever seems to get done, much to the chagrin of developers who find themselves the target of CEQA litigation.  The California legislature may have taken a small, but important, step toward rectifying this situation with its 2010 enactment of Public Resources Code Section 21169.11.  The statute was enacted as part of an urgency measure, to curb litigation abuses and provide relief from frivolous claims made in CEQA actions.  (SB 1456 (Stats. 2010, Ch. 496.))

In brief, the new statute provides:

  • Where a court determines a claim made in the course of a CEQA action is frivolous, i.e., totally and completely without merit, it “may impose an appropriate sanction, in an amount up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000)”
  • “The sanction may be imposed upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties responsible for the violation.”
  • The sanctions motion may be made “at any time after a petition has been filed pursuant to this division, but at least 30 days before the hearing on the merits.”
    Continue Reading CEQA Sanctions Statute: Effective Deterrent To Abuse?