In an opinion filed September 3, and later certified for publication on October 5, 2026, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment denying a writ petition challenging the Town of Los Gatos’s (“Town”) approval of a lot line adjustment for three adjacent residential parcels, and its related acceptance of a dedication of land for a new public street; the trial court found the Town’s approval of the project was a ministerial action exempt from CEQA.  While recognizing that lot line adjustments are normally exempt from CEQA under the “prototypical ministerial approval process” prescribed by the Subdivision Map Act’s exclusion for adjustments involving four or fewer adjoining parcels (Gov. Code, § 66412(d)), the Court of Appeal held that the scope of the project at issue here – because it included the Town’s discretionary acceptance of a property dedication for a new public cul-de-sac – rendered it sufficiently discretionary in nature to require CEQA review.  Alison Steer v. Town of Los Gatos (Daran Goodsell, et al., Real Parties in Interest) (2026) 123 Cal.App.5th 1067.

Factual and Procedural Background

The owners of three adjacent residentially zoned parcels in the Town applied in Spring 2023 for a lot line adjustment, also proposing an offer of dedication of an easement for a cul-de-sac at the end of an existing public street so that the resulting lots could satisfy ingress and egress and street frontage requirements of the Town’s land use regulations.  One of the three existing lots was a 74,832 square-foot parcel, improved with a house and having public street frontage; that parcel conformed to applicable zoning, which required a 20,000 square-foot minimum lot size and 100 feet of street frontage or 30 feet of frontage on a cul-de-sac.  The other two lots were unimproved and nonconforming parcels, 11,226 square feet and 48,112 square feet in size, and both lacked any street frontage.  The proposed dedication to the Town of a public street easement for a cul-de-sac was thus required, in addition to the lot line adjustment, to make those lots buildable and render them conforming to local general plan, specific plan, and zoning requirements.

The Town’s development review commission conditionally approved the lot line adjustment, subject to the requirement that the owners make an offer of dedication of the cul-de-sac shown on the map and that the Town accept it within 30 days.  Arguing that the lot line adjustment was discretionary due to the conditions, and thus subject to CEQA, Steer unsuccessfully appealed the development review commission’s decision to the Town’s planning commission, and then appealed to the Town Council, which held a hearing in December 2023.  Steer argued that the Town could not create a new city street without CEQA review to analyze potentially significant environmental impacts involving tree-cutting, grading, hydrology, storm drainage, traffic, etc.  The Town disagreed on the grounds that actual construction of the cul-de-sac was not being proposed or approved, future construction would require discretionary review, and the lot line adjustment decision was strictly ministerial under the Map Act’s § 66412(d) exclusion.  The Town Council thus denied Steer’s appeal and approved the adjustment subject to the requirements that the owners make irrevocable offers of dedication of a public street easement for the specifically delineated cul-de-sac area within 90 days of approval to ensure compliance with minimum street frontage standards, and that the Town Engineer accept the dedication within 30 days.  The Town filed a Notice of Exemption the next day containing findings that its approval was purely ministerial under Government Code § 66412(d).

The trial court denied Steer’s ensuing writ petition challenging the Town’s approval on the grounds that, even if the dedication acceptance were considered discretionary, the discretion involved was strictly circumscribed by § 66412(d) and unrelated to environmental impacts, and it was unclear that the Town had any discretion to refuse an offer of dedication that would bring the lot line adjustment into compliance with zoning.  The trial court thus upheld the CEQA exemption determination as supported by substantial evidence.  Steer timely appealed.  The Court of Appeal reversed.

The Court of Appeal’s Opinion

The Court of Appeal saw things differently than the Town and the trial court.  Foundational to the Court of Appeal’s analysis were CEQA’s broad definitions of a “project” (1) to include “approval of private activities” with “the potential to cause a physical change in the environment” (citing, inter alia, Pub. Resources Code, § 21065, and Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1186, my August 21, 2019 post on which can be found here), and (2) as the “whole of an action” so as to ensure CEQA compliance is not elided by what is sometimes referred to as piecemealing a single project into smaller subparts to avoid analysis of the environmental impacts of the project as a whole.

Ministerial projects are exempt from CEQA by statute regardless of their potential to affect the environment.  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080(b)(1), (2); CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15061(b)(1), 15260.)  Whether a project is ministerial or discretionary turns on whether the law providing the controls over the activity authorizes the agency to use its subjective judgment in deciding whether and how to approve the project – in which case it is discretionary and subject to CEQA – or whether it requires the agency to act in a set way without exercising subjective judgment, such as where it is merely authorized to determine “conformity with applicable statutes, ordinances, regulations, or other fixed standards.”  (Citing Protecting Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479, 493 (“POWER”), my August 28, 2020 post on which can be found here.)  In the latter case, the project is ministerial and not subject to CEQA because under the governing law the applicant can legally compel approval if fixed standards are met and the agency lacks discretion to shape the project in any way which could respond to environmental concerns that might be identified in a CEQA review.  (Citing id. and other cases.)

Even if an agency has some discretionary authority over an aspect of a project, it is still ministerial for CEQA purposes if that authority does not extend to addressing environmental impacts.  (Citing id. at 494, citing McCorkle Eastside Neighborhood Group v. City of St. Helena (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 80, 94, my January 14, 2019 post on which can be found here; see also, e.g., Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 11, my April 24, 2017 post on which can be found here.) 

Also germane to the Court’s analysis is the Subdivision Map Act, California’s primary regulatory control over the design and improvement of subdivisions of land.  The key point here is that the Map Act excludes lot line adjustments of already existing parcels meeting certain criteria and creating no additional parcels from its discretionary approval process for subdivisions, and prescribes a “prototypical ministerial approval process” for such adjustments of existing lot lines of four or fewer parcels.  (Citing Sierra Club v. Napa County Board of Supervisors (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 162, 179, my April 23, 2012 post on which can be found here.)

The final body of law critical to the Court of Appeal’s analysis is that governing offers of dedication of private land for public use, which can occur pursuant to common law or statutory authority; such offers are generally governed by contract principles requiring the public agency’s acceptance of the offer before a dedicated public easement or street can be created.

Drawing on all of the above areas of law as relevant to its analysis, the Court of Appeal determined that the relevant “project” for CEQA purposes – i.e., the “whole of the action” – consisted not only of the 3-parcel lot line adjustment, but also included the subsequent dedication and acceptance of the public cul-de-sac easement and its delineation on the Town map.  It determined this “scope of [the] project” issue as presenting a question of law subject to de novo review to be determined on the undisputed facts in the record.  (Citing Tuolumne County Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Sonora (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1224; CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(a).)  It rejected the Town’s argument that the “project” did not include the cul-de-sac because it was only a “paper street” that may never be constructed, noting that the Town’s acceptance of the easement dedication created a property interest in the Town reflected in the Town map as an extension of an existing street, together with possible liability and maintenance obligations.

At the same time, the Court rejected Steer’s argument that the Town’s approval created a common law vested right in the applicants to future development or construction of the cul-de-sac, because, inter alia, the Town repeatedly made clear throughout the application and approval process that any future development or construction activities would require a discretionary Architecture and Site permit.  Further, it rejected Steer’s argument that the Town had unlawfully pre-committed to the construction of the cul-de-sac in the specific location of the easement delineated on the Town map without required CEQA review under the principles articulated in Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 121-122, 139, 142.  The Court found “Save Tara inapposite at this stage” because it was reversing and directing issuance of a writ setting aside the Town’s CEQA exemption determination and project approvals, and it would be “premature and in the nature of an advisory opinion” to address hypothetical future Town actions following remand.  It rejected Steer’s piecemealing argument as forfeited because it was unarticulated and unsupported by reasoned analysis and record citations.

In its Opinion’s final section of analysis, the Court explained in detail its conclusion that the project was discretionary and hence not CEQA-exempt.  First, as a factual matter subject to substantial evidence review, the Project included the dedication and discretionary acceptance of the cul-de-sac easement, and to the extent the Town found otherwise no substantial evidence supported that determination.  Further, the addition of the common law dedication component to the lot line adjustment clearly moved the project into the discretionary category under the law controlling and governing the Town’s acceptance of such dedications.  That law, per the Court, provides that “the Town can use its subjective judgment to decide whether to accept the dedication – that is, to shape the project, or outright deny it.”  (Citing POWER, at 494.)  After a lengthy analysis of the authorities establishing public agencies’ discretion to accept or reject statutory dedications, the Court saw “no reason why an agency would lack that discretion where an offer of dedication is made pursuant to the common law.”

Here, the Town’s discretionary acceptance of the dedication resulted in the creation of a new public street, and attendant liability and maintenance obligations, and “the Town had the discretion to reject – or require modification of – the offer of dedication, based on environmental concerns” such as those raised by Steer “regarding potential project impacts relating to fire safety, seismic stability, stormwater, and trees.”  In sum, the Town’s treatment of the project as ministerial “failed to recognize its discretion with respect to accepting the offer of dedication.”

Conclusion and Implications

The Court clarified that just because lot line adjustments pursuant to Government Code § 66412(d) are typically ministerial in nature, it does not follow that they are always ministerial.  Here, the concurrent processing of another discretionary approval along with the lot line adjustment – i.e., a common law public street dedication – as part of the same project rendered the “whole of the action” discretionary under controlling law.  Accordingly, the Court held the Town here had discretion to meaningfully address the overall project’s potentially significant environmental impacts.  Per the Court:

“Government Code section 66412, subdivision (d), does not place an agency in a ministerial box that strips it of any discretion it would otherwise have over a project approval.  We do not believe the Legislature intended the statute to provide a means of evading CEQA review merely by including a separate discretionary approval within the context of a lot line adjustment application.  Nor did the Legislature intend for the statute to allow a private party to force a public agency to accept a dedication of property and the delineation of a new cul-de-sac, along with the commensurate liability and maintenance obligations.  [citation]”

As a land use lawyer who has long been “in the trenches” litigating issues involving lot line adjustments and CEQA’s critical “ministerial/discretionary” distinction – I successfully litigated both of the Sierra Club cases cited above at the trial and appellate levels – I can fully appreciate the significance of the Sixth District’s decision here to land use entitlement attorneys seeking, and local agencies acting on applications for, lot line adjustments.  While the apparent theory behind the Map Act’s exclusion is that the lot line adjustments within it are not particularly environmentally impactful because they are not subdivisions creating new lots, and are thus not of sufficient concern to require discretionary processing as parcel maps under the Act, that theory might not hold true in all cases, e.g., where an adjustment makes a previously non-buildable lot buildable.  In structuring lot line adjustment applications, careful attention must be paid not only to the limited discretion an agency has under the exclusion to impose conditions requiring resulting parcels to conform to local general plan, specific plan, and zoning and building ordinance requirements, but to its discretion under the law governing any other approvals concurrently sought.  As discussed in the Opinion, local lot line adjustment ordinances vary by jurisdiction in their requirements – although all must conform to Government Code § 66412(d)’s significant limits on agency discretion – as do the other relevant local land use regulations, so there is no “one size fits all” answer to the question whether a particular lot line adjustment is ministerial.  What the Court of Appeal’s decision here teaches is that a project coupling a lot line adjustment with another approval that is discretionary will likely render the “whole of the action” a discretionary project subject to CEQA review – regardless of whether the lot line adjustment standing alone would be ministerial. 

Questions? Please contact Arthur F. Coon of Miller Starr Regalia. Miller Starr Regalia has had a well-established reputation as a leading real estate law firm for more than sixty years. For nearly all that time, the firm also has written Miller & Starr, California Real Estate 4th, a 12-volume treatise on California real estate law. “The Book” is the most widely used and judicially recognized real estate treatise in California and is cited by practicing attorneys and courts throughout the state. The firm has expertise in all real property matters, including full-service litigation and dispute resolution services, transactions, acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, financing, common interest development, construction, management, eminent domain and inverse condemnation, title insurance, environmental law and land use. For more information, visit www.msrlegal.com